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Abstract: Fraud and terrorism have a close connect in terms of the processes that enables and promote them. In the era 
of Internet, its various services that include Web, e-mail, social networks, blogs, instant messaging, chats, etc. are used in 
terrorism not only for communication but also for i) creation of ideology, ii) resource gathering, iii) recruitment, 
indoctrination and training, iv) creation of terror network, and v) information gathering. A major challenge for law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies is efficient and accurate gathering of relevant and growing volume of crime data. 
This paper reports on use of established Naïve Bayesian filter for classification of threat e-mails. Efficiency in filtering 
threat e-mail by use of three different Naïve Bayesian filter approaches i.e. single keywords, weighted multiple keywords 
and weighted multiple keywords with keyword context matching are evaluated on a threat e-mail corpus created by 
extracting data from sources that are very close to terrorism. 
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1. Introduction 
Terrorism, which is politically and emotionally charged, 
involves violence and threat of violence [1, 2]. The most 
lethal terrorist attack in history commonly known as 9/11 
which tool lives of 3000 Americans and international 
citizens led to far reaching changes in anti-terror approaches 
and operations in the US and around the Globe [3]. Several 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies are actively 
collecting and analyzing crime data to detect and prevent 
future attacks. Various resource centers and databases like 
TPDRC [4] and GTD [5] have been created to archive and 
distribute data collected by government agencies, non-
government agencies and researchers about terrorism to 
extent research and administrative data from across the 
world that are relevant to the study of terrorism.  
E-mail has emerged as a free, valuable and crucial 
worldwide business tool that not only supports conversation 
between parties but also supports delivery of documents and 
archives of diverse nature.  Over the last few years, the 
arteries of e-mail have become literally clogged by spam, 
viruses, and any other content that can be sent via e-mail. 
Spam e-mails often contain offensive, fraudulent, adult 
oriented and misleading material that cause several 
problems [6] either directly or indirectly to the e-mail 
system that include: i) network conjunction, ii) misuse of 
storage space and computational resources, iii) loss of work 
productivity and annoyance to users, iv) legal issues as a 
result of pornographic advertisements and other 
objectionable material, v) financial losses through phishing 
and other related attacks, vi) spread of viruses, worms and 
Trojan Horses, and vii) Denial of Services and Directory 
Harvesting attacks. Several anti-spam procedures have been 
proposed that try to tackle the problem of spam at various 
levels in the system [7]. These procedures propose the use 
of diverse technological, legal, social and economical 
solutions. A high level review of spam filtering procedures 
is provided in [8, 9].  
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E-mail is also misused to send threat e-mails and 
disseminate other objectionable material related to 
terrorism. Threat e-mails send threat of an attack to people 
or government in order to create panic or disturbance. 
Further, e-mails that disseminate material objectionable to 
governments like terrorism propaganda for creation of 
ideology, resource gathering and fund raising may also be 
classified as threat e-mails. Threat e-mails may be classified 
by spam filters as legitimate or spam depending upon their 
content. However, for law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies a threat e-mail is a source of investigations 
regardless of the threat being true or false and thus cannot 
be treated as spam. Anti-terror approaches can be 
strengthened by monitoring e-mail archives of suspects and 
installations of „threat e-mail detectors‟ at mail servers. 
Several studies have been carried out to compare and 
contrast relative efficiency of learning based filters; 
however, limited literature is available on use of filters for 
detection of threat e-mail. S. Appavu et al in their research 
works [10-13] have used Decision Tree, SVM, NN and 
Naïve Bayes approaches for detecting threat e-mail. These 
studies compared efficiency and effectiveness of some 
filters in classifying threat e-mails and reported that 
Decision Tree based filters outperformed others. A 
limitation with these studies non-availability of threat e-mail 
corpus.  
In this study instead of using self created threat e-mail 
messages, we used data that was extracted from various 
sources which either belongs to terrorists or keep record of 
terrorism or report terrorism or have some form of 
interaction with them. We used terrorism websites, 
newspapers, data available with resource centers and 
databases like TPDRC and GTD to create an e-mail corpus 
and applied Naïve Bayes filtering approaches for its 
classification. The remaining paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 introduces e-mail filter, its operation and Bayesian 
filtering approach. Section 3 details on the corpus and 
Bayesian approaches used in our experiments.  It presents 
results obtained through experiments on the threat e-mail 
corpus and analyzes them in terms of various metrics used 
to evaluate them. We draw conclusion and present future 
research motivation in section 4. 
2. E-mail Filters 
An e-mail message consists of two parts, namely header and 
body. Header is a structured set of fields, each having a 
name and specific meaning. It includes fields namely From, 
To, Subject, CC, BCC, etc. Message body generally referred 
to as content of the message is usually text, possibly with 
HTML markup and MIME encoded attachments. Message 
analysis and filtering involves selection of features from 
header and/or body or from message as a whole relevant for 
analysis. A filter may check the presence of certain words or 
may consider the arrival of a dozen of substantially identical 
messages in a certain slot of time. In addition to this, a 
learning-based filter analyzes a collection of labeled training 
data which are pre-collected messages with reliable 
judgment. 
A spam filter in general is an application that implements a 
function to classify an incoming e-mail message as spam or 
legitimate mail using a particular classification method. 
Such a system implements the following function: 
        
                                        
                                               
  
Where,   is the message to be classified,   is a vector 
of parameters, and       and      are respectively spam 
and legitimate messages. 
Most of Spam filters including the statistical spam filters 
use machine learning classification techniques wherein the 
vector of parameter   is the result of training the classifier 
on a pre-collected dataset which may be rebuilding itself 
with every new message.   for such filters can be defined 
as: 
        
Learning-based spam filters treat the input data as an 
unstructured set of tokens, filtering can be applied either to 
the whole message or to any part of it. For this group of 
filters with two classes of messages: spam and legitimate 
mail, there exists a set of labeled training messages, each 
message being a vector of   binary features and each label 
being       or      depending on the class of the message. 
The training data set M, once pre-processed in this way, can 
be described as: 
                             
     
                   
Where,   is the number of features used.       
  is a 
new sample the classifier should provide a decision 
                               and labels and   being 
the training function. 
2.1. Filter Model 
Learning based e-mail filter consist of learning and 
detection stages as shown in figure 1. The learning stage 
uses a training set in the form of known spam and legitimate 
e-mails collectively called e-mail corpus. Features are 
extracted from each e-mail of corpus, which are then 
reduced by a feature reduction function. A training function 
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calculates likelihood probability of each feature occurring in 
spam and legitimate e-mails. It also calculates the prior 
probability of each class i.e. spam and legitimate. The 
feature sets along with their likelihood probabilities are 
stored in a library for use in the detection stage. A new e-
mail message is parsed in the detection stage with respect to 
the features in the feature set and group probabilities of each 
group are calculated. If the total calculated probability of 
spam is greater than some predefined threshold value, the 
mail is classified as spam otherwise it is classified as 
legitimate. The feature set and feature probability library is 
updated with every new classified e-mail.  
 
 
 
2.2. Bayesian Filtering Approach 
Bayes theorem also known as Bayes reasoning is used to 
solve problems which involve conditional probabilities. It 
was published by Thomos Bayes (1702-1761) and 
calculates posterior probability based on the probabilities of 
previous samples. The theorem has been used to classify an 
e-mail into spam and ham (legitimate) classes by many 
researchers using different approaches. Most prominent 
works are of Sahami and Androutsopoulos [14], Paul 
Graham‟s [15] and Gary Robinson [16]. Using Bayesian 
filtering, an e-mail message    presented by a set of    
features                    can be classified into a 
particular class    (e.g. spam (     ) and legitimate (    )) 
as follows: 
             
                   
       
 
Where              is the likelihood Probability 
of    occurring in   .         represents a prior 
probability of an e-mail being in class    calculated from 
training examples.         is the probability of    
occurring in training examples which will remain constant 
for an e-mail message while analyzing it.  
It is hard to estimate the likelihood probability of 
             because it needs complete coverage of 
the feature space in order to calculate probabilities. Under 
Paul Graham‟s [15] Naïve Bayesian assumption that 
attribute values in feature set    are conditionally 
independent given the target value of spam or ham 
(legitimate); this probability is calculated as the product of 
probabilities of the individual attributes. Thus 
              
 
                      
          
 
          
             
        
 
 
 
Prior probability         can be estimated from the 
training set as:  
         
                                         
                                              
  
If                ,       is the number of legitimate e-
mails and      is the number of spam e-mails in the 
E-mail Corpus (M) 
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Figure 1: Learning E-mail Filter Model 
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training corpus then prior probability             
    
          
 . 
The training set can also be used to estimate conditional 
probability of individual attributes               as 
follows: 
               
                                                     
                                       
 
If        spam e-mail and        legitimate e-mails 
contain a feature    then for an e-mail randomly selected 
from , a simple estimation for                  can 
be obtained as 
       
    
.  Further, by definition the probability 
of    occurring in training examples          is given by 
                
          
. Paul Graham‟s [15] calculates 
                 as follows: 
                       
     
           
 
Where        
       
    
 and        
       
     
.  
3. Experimental Setup and Analysis 
3.1. Testing Corpus 
To our knowledge no dataset of threat e-mails is publically 
available in form of a corpus for analysis. Researchers are 
thus forced to create their own threat e-mail dataset which 
makes the exact analysis of filtering algorithms difficult. In 
order to make our analysis more accurate, we choose to 
create threat e-mail corpus from sources that are close to 
terrorism. We selected e-mail corpus containing 7000 e-mail 
messages of which 2700 were legitimate, 2700 were spam 
and 1600 were threat with no messages having its duplicates 
in the dataset. Threat e-mail were created from multiple 
sources that include: data available on terrorist websites, 
names of terrorist organizations, names of top terrorists, 
data available in newspapers pertaining to terrorist attacks, 
threats to government and appeals for shutdowns received 
by a newspaper for publications, etc. Maximum size of the 
message was limited to 200 words. Legitimate and spam e-
mails received by the authors in their e-mail accounts along 
with messages created from data present in the websites and 
news pertaining to terrorism other than threat messages 
were used as a source for non-threat e-mails. We also used 
publically available e-mail filtering corpus LingSpam as a 
source of non-threat e-mails for evaluation. It produced 
results close to those obtained with the reported dataset. We, 
in our experiment used different data sizes with different 
number of features. 75% of the messages from each set 
were used for training and the remaining 25% messages 
were used for evaluation. Spam and legitimate messages 
were collectively used as non-threat messages. A few 
sample threat e-mails used in our experiments are given in 
appendix. 
3.2. Feature extraction and reduction 
The subject and the body fields of each e-mail message in 
the corpus were tokenized based on the space and 
punctuation. Further, we removed tokens of less than 4 
characters which make text classification easy by 
eliminating words that are found frequently in a list. These 
stop list words include words such as a, as, the, for, on, etc. 
which are not useful in classification. We used Porter 
Steaming algorithm for word steaming to convert words to 
their morphological base automatically. Stopword removal 
and word steaming considerably reduces feature space and 
improves prediction accuracy. One keyword, two keyword 
and three keyword tokens are extracted and used as features 
using Term Frequency (TF) vector. Top most valuable 
features extracted in feature extraction are selected on the 
basis of information gain (IG) of each feature. Next k-mean 
algorithm is used to partition the feature space into four 
groups of similar features.  
3.3. Bayesian approaches used in Experiments 
A feature selected as a token may be a single keyword with 
or without weights assigned to them or combination of two 
or more keywords with different weights assigned to multi-
keywords. Further, as proposed in [17] keyword contexts 
can be added to the weighted spam score to make the 
classification more accurate. Accordingly three different 
approaches namely single keyword, weighted multiple 
keyword and weighted multiple keyword with keyword 
context matching are possible.  
In the first approach, weights are either not applied to 
keywords or same weights are applied to single and multi-
keywords. The Bayesian threat score        is calculated by 
adding the individual keyword score          for all 
keywords. This can be mathematically expressed as: 
          
  
   
        
In the second approach, different weights are assigned to 
tokens having different number of keywords in it e.g. a 
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weight of      to tokens of two keywords and       
for tokens of 3 keywords. Tokens containing more 
keywords in it are assigned higher weights than those 
having fewer keywords. Weights assigned to tokens 
            multiplied by individual keyword scores 
           are summed up to get the Bayesian weighted 
threat score          as shown below: 
            
        
       
                      
In the third approach, keyword context score is added to the 
weighted Bayesian score for all keywords found in the e-
mail. Thus Bayesian context weighted threat score  
         is thus calculated as: 
                
        
                        
                                       
Where              is the keyword context score 
which is a function of the matching percentage and is 
determined by the number of keyword matching for each 
token e.g. if two keywords out of four match this will be 
50%.                 are the weights associated with 
contexts that correspond to tokens of different keywords e.g. 
    ,     ,      correspond to tokens of one, two and three 
keywords.    and     are weighting factors that can be 
used to control the contribution of threat score from 
keywords and keyword contexts. 
In our experiments, we used one keyword, two keyword and 
three keyword tokens with a weight of 1, 2 and 3 
respectively assigned to them. Feature space was divided 
into four groups with each group containing related features. 
Weights associated with contexts that corresponded to 
tokens and weighing factors (W1 and W2) were fine tuned to 
achieve higher accuracy.  
3.4. Evaluation Measures 
To evaluate the predictive accuracy of classifiers several 
measures have been proposed in literature [18]. The most 
simple measure is filtering accuracy namely percentage of 
messages classified correctly. More informative measures 
are recall and precision. Weighted error rate and weighted 
accuracy are a measure to evaluate filter accuracy. TCR is 
the relative cost of using the filter (and so having some false 
positives and some false negatives) to using no filter at all 
(and so having all the spam misclassified, but all the 
legitimate mail classified correctly). F-measure is the 
weighted harmonic mean of precision and recall. Since false 
positive are often more expensive than false negative, it is 
vital to compare the false positive rate of the classifier. The 
Receiver Operator Characteristics (ROC) curve is a graph to 
plot false positive against true positive, in which various 
threshold values are compared. We present, these measures 
in terms of threat and normal (spam and legitimate) e-mail 
as in table 1. 
Let      be the number of normal messages classified as 
normal,      be the number of normal messages 
misclassified as threat,      be the number of threat 
messages classified as threat,      be the number of threat 
messages misclassified as normal and   be the weight on the 
accuracy of the classifier.  
Evaluation 
Measure 
Evaluation Function 
Accuracy 
     
          
                     
  
Weighted 
Accuracy          
           
                         
  
Error Rate 
         
          
                     
  
Weighted 
Error Rate         
           
                         
  
False 
Positive 
Rate 
        
    
          
  
False 
Negative 
Rate 
        
    
          
  
Recall 
   
    
          
  
Precision 
   
    
          
  
Total Cost 
Ratio          
          
          
  
ROC Curve True positive rate plotted against false 
positive rate 
Table 1: Evaluation measures for Spam Filters 
3.5. Results 
Figure 2 plots the accuracy of Bayesian Single Keywords 
(BS), Bayesian weighted Multiple Keywords (BM) and 
Bayesian weighted Multiple Keywords with keyword 
Context matching (BMC) based filters as a function of data 
sizes. Accuracy of filters improved with increase in data 
IJSDIA International Journal of Secure Digital Information Age, Vol. 1. No. 2                         108 
size. Accuracy of BMC based filter improved by more than 
4% while that of BM based filter improved by about 3%. 
Bayesian Single Keyword based filter did not improve much 
in accuracy with increase in training data size. Further, it 
was observed that the accuracy of BMC based filter 
improved greatly for higher percentage of spam. 
 
Figure 2: Accuracy vs. Data Size 
In figure 3 accuracy of filters as a function of feature sizes is 
plotted. The accuracy of all filters improved with increase in 
the feature size of the classifier. For BMC based filters 
accuracy improved by 6% which is higher than that of filters 
based on BM and BS.  
 
Figure 3: Accuracy vs. Number of Features 
Performance of filters in terms of precision, recall, false 
positive rate, false negative rate, and F-measure is shown in 
table 2. This comparison is based on a data size of 7000 e-
mails using 60 features for classification.   
Measure BS BM BMC 
Precision ( ) 90.76% 97.56% 98.10% 
Recall ( ) 92.57% 91.43% 95.74% 
False Positive Rate 
(      ) 
9.43% 2.29% 1.86% 
False Negative Rate 
(      ) 
7.43% 8.57% 4.26% 
f-measure (  ) 91.65% 94.40% 96.91% 
Table 2: Performance in terms of Precision, Recall, FP, 
FN and f1 
Appavu alias Balamurugan and his colleagues in their 
research [13] have reported the results of the use of several 
techniques in detecting threat e-mails from two different 
sets of e-mails (C1 and C2). These results are mentioned in 
table 3. Owing to the use of different data sets, it is not 
logical to compare the reported results with those obtained 
in our experiments. However, since in both, data set is 
created by farming threat e-mails and combining them with 
normal e-mails to form the e-mail corpus, comparison 
between the two can be drawn with a reasonable error.   
Filtering 
Technique 
Evaluation Measures in %age 
         
C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2 
ADI-IG 98.75 95.50 97.88 94.15 96.72 93.82 97.29 93.98 
DT-IG 97.28 92.45 94.44 90.40 94.04 92.42 94.24 91.40 
SVM-IG 95.65 92.10 97.78 94.05 80.89 87.40 88.54 90.60 
NB-IG 94.93 86.35 91.64 93.83 82.20 74.20 86.66 82.87 
ADI-TFV 99.20 99.10 97.10 96.75 96.72 96.45 96.91 96.59 
DT-TFV 98.80 98.30 96.30 96.25 96.10 96.05 96.20 96.15 
SVM-TFV 98.50 98.10 94.10 94.50 92.80 91.90 93.45 93.13 
NB-TFV 94.41 89.35 90.54 96.20 79.89 78.40 84.88 86.39 
Table 3: Performance in terms of Accuracy, Precision, 
Recall and f-measure 
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When comparing various evaluation measures of filters 
given in table 3 with those produced by our experiments 
given in table 2, it is clear that the performance of Naïve 
Bayesian filtering approaches used in our experiments are 
comparable and satisfactory. The precision of Bayesian 
weighted Multiple Keywords with keyword Context 
matching (BMC) based filter has remained higher than other 
filters.  
In table 4, the weighted error rate obtained for various filters 
using different weight is compared. 
Weight ( ) 
Weighted Error Rate 
BS BM BMC 
1 8.43% 5.43% 3.06% 
9 9.23% 2.91% 2.10% 
999 9.4% 2.3% 1.9% 
Table 4: Weighted Error rate with different values for   
Although no Bayesian filter showed 100% predictive 
accuracy but the Bayesian weighted Multiple Keywords 
with keyword Context matching (BMC) based filter 
achieved nearly 97% accuracy.  Highest false positive rate 
was shown by Bayesian Single Keywords (BS) based filter 
followed by Bayesian weighted Multiple Keywords (BM) 
and Bayesian weighted Multiple Keywords with keyword 
Context matching (BMC) based filter. The false positive 
rate of BMC based filter has remained as low as 1.86%. The 
f-measure of BMC based filter remained nearly 97%, 
highest of all others. Further, weighted error rate of BMC 
based filter is lowest in comparison to that of filters based 
on other approaches. This rate further reduced with higher 
values of weight. 
Total Cost Ratio (TCR) based on data size of 7000 e-mails 
using 60 features with weights of 1, 9 and 999 for different 
filters is given in table 5. TCR being a unifying measure of 
spam recall and precision incorporates the cost difference 
between two error types namely false positive and false 
negative. Higher value of TCR indicates better performance 
of filter. Any value of TCR that is less than 1 indicates 
filters inefficiency and is cost wise worst than not using the 
filter at all.  For    , in all three different Naïve Bayesian 
filter approaches TCR score remained more than 1. The 
Bayesian weighted Multiple Keywords with keyword 
Context matching (BMC) based filter scored highest TCR 
score followed by Bayesian weighted Multiple Keywords 
(BM) and Bayesian Single Keywords (BS) based filters. 
For    , again all filters achieved TCR greater than 1 but 
for      , TCR score for all filters dropped below 1. This 
is due to the very high penalty on normal mail misclassified 
as threat and none of the three filters managed to eliminate 
these errors completely. For a value of        or its any 
other value for which TCR score drops below 1 despite 
higher values of precision and recall, it can be concluded 
that none it is better not to use the filter at all. But, 
depending upon the nature of the filter application like 
identification of threat e-mails a much higher value of    
may not be desirable but high recall is desired even at some 
cost of precision. 
Weight ( ) 
TCR Scores 
BS BM BMC 
1 5.932 9.210 16.355 
9 1.083 3.431 4.768 
999 0.011 0.043 0.0537 
Table 5: TCR with different values for   
In order to evaluate three different Naïve Bayesian filter 
approaches across the tradeoff between true positives and 
true negatives, we present the results through a discrete plot 
called the ROC graph shown in figure 4. The ROC curve is 
a graphical plot of spam accuracy or spam recall or true 
positive rate called formerly sensitivity on Y-axis against 
false positive rate or ham misclassification rate or the 
complement of ham recall formerly called 1-specificity on 
X-axis. Each point on the graph shown in figure 4 
corresponds to an actual (false positive rate, true positive 
rate) pair achieved by particular Naïve Bayesian filter on a 
particular size of the data set. We have restricted the 
horizontal axis to a maximum of 0.2 i.e. 20% of the false 
positive rate and the vertical axis from 0.8 to improve 
readability. Points on the left side of the graph in the upper 
triangle and close to X-axis  (for conservative classifiers) 
make positive classifications only with a strong evidence 
and thus make few false positive errors but often have low 
true positive rates as well. Such a point in figure 4 is point 
labeled as A. Points on the upper right side of the graph in 
the upper triangle (for liberal classifiers) make positive 
classifications with weak evidences and thus classify nearly 
all positives correctly but often have high false positive 
rates. Such a point in figure 4 is point labeled as B. It is 
difficult if not impossible some day to have a perfect 
classification i.e. a point at (0, 1). Any point near it is better 
than others. Such a point in figure 4 is labeled as C. The 
plotted results indicate that all used Naïve Bayesian filtering 
approach are characterized by points in the upper left 
quadrant in the graph but the Naïve Bayesian approach 
based on weighted Multiple Keywords with keyword 
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Context matching (BMC) is more to the northwest i.e. true 
positive rate is higher and false positive rate is lower.  
 
Figure 4: ROC curves of the filters 
Overall, the Naïve Bayesian approach based on weighted 
Multiple Keywords with keyword Context matching (BMC) 
obtained the best results in our experiments both in spam 
and ham recall, however, the difference from other Naïve 
Bayesian approaches were small.  
4. Conclusion 
Naïve Bayesian filtering approaches namely single 
keywords, weighted multiple keywords and weighted 
multiple keywords with keyword context matching were 
evaluated in terms of various metrics on a threat e-mail 
corpus created by extracting data from sources that are very 
close to terrorism. None of these classification techniques 
showed 100% predicative accuracy but weighted multiple 
keywords with keyword context matching Naïve Bayesian 
filtering approach showed promising performance in terms 
of accuracy, ability to learn, and F-measure. Further, 
weighted error, false positive and false negative rates 
remained very low in comparison to that of filters based on 
other approaches. Since accuracy of filter evaluation is 
highly determined by relevance of training data, thus it is 
necessary to create a threat e-mail corpus to facilitate 
researchers in designing systems capable of automatically 
detecting and blocking terrorism threats by misuse of e-mail 
system. The openness of e-mail system and its use in 
unlawful activities makes filtering an active area for 
research and thus there exists a wide scope for development 
of new filters and improvements in the existing ones. 
Appendix 
Some examples of the threat e-mail used in our corpus that 
can give readers an insight of the underlying data set, are 
hereunder. 
Example 1: 
Today there will be bomb blast in parliament house and the 
US consulates in India at 11:46 am. Stop it if you could. Cut 
relations with the U.S.A. Long live Osama Finladen 
Asadullah Alkalfi. 
Example 2: (E-mail Intercepted by MessageLabs)  
Attention Please 
Make sure this gets to the manager as soon as possible, 
because this is the only way to pass this information to you 
and get this case settled. We have been paid to set an 
electronic explosive device (Bomb) in your hotel which we 
have done. But I feel like helping you people, I have a 
concrete evidence of this information on a tape record and 
the second tape contains the information and contact of our 
employer. I demand $130,000(USD) which must be paid 
before I could disclose any information to you. I need to 
settle my tem with this money so they can go back to their 
destinations. I traveled to Africa on a business trip but I 
have everything under my control. I will mail you the tapes 
but that will be after my boys have gone and am assured of 
your maximum co-operation. 
Note: My employer has a secret agent working with you in 
your hotel. Therefore this information must not be known or 
exposed to anybody else my employer will sense betrayal 
and you know what that means. (I will not accept any 
apology if you people make any mistake). 
Do will have a deal or not? 
Reply this email as soon as possible 
Mind you, time is essence. 
Example 3: 
Dear Brother 
We are fighting for your and our independence from the 
draconic occupation of <country name>. We need men, 
money and arms to continue with our struggle for freedom. 
You are welcome to fight along with us. If it is not possible 
for you to fight actively you can still be part of this freedom 
struggle by contributing money to <organization name>. 
We invite you to visit our website <web address>.  
Remember <country name> is our enemy and we have to 
fight for the independence of ourselves.  
 
<name of person> 
<organization name>  
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